Rohingya musulmaņi Mjanmā

Neskatoties uz to, ka 2016. gadā Mjanmā (Birmā) tika izveidota jauna demokrātiski ievēlēta valdība, kuru vadīja Nobela Miera prēmijas laureāts Aung San Suu Kyi Nacionālā demokrātijas līga, situācija joprojām bija šausmīga valsts vajātajā musulmaņu minoritātē, kas pazīstama kā rohingya. Kā norādi uz apņemšanos rast problēmu risinājumu, valdība 2016. gada augustā iecēla bijušo ANO ģenerālsekretāru Kofi Annanu vadīt padomdevēju komisiju, lai veiktu novērtējumus un sniegtu ieteikumus.

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Kas ir rohingi?

Terminu Rohingya parasti izmantoja, it īpaši starptautiskajos plašsaziņas līdzekļos, lai apzīmētu musulmaņu kopienu, kas parasti bija koncentrēta divās Mjanmas Rakhine (Arakānas) štata ziemeļu pilsētās, lai gan viņus varēja atrast arī par pastāvīgiem iedzīvotājiem citās valsts daļās un valsti, kā arī bēgļu nometnēs Bangladešā. Tika aprēķināts, ka rohingi veido apmēram vienu trešdaļu Rakhine štata iedzīvotāju, un Rakhine budisti veido ievērojamu daļu no atlikušajām divām trešdaļām.

Termina Rohingya lietošana Mjanmā tika ļoti apstrīdēta. Rohingjas politiskie līderi ir uzsvēruši, ka savējie ir atšķirīga etniskā, kultūras un valodu kopiena, kas izseko tās senčiem jau 7. gadsimta beigās. Tomēr plašāka budistu grupa kopumā noraidīja rohingu terminoloģiju, atsaucoties uz viņiem nevis uz bengāļu valodu, un uzskatīja, ka kopienu lielākoties veido nelegāli imigranti no mūsdienu Bangladešas. 2014. gada tautas skaitīšanas laikā - pirmā, kas tika veikta 30 gadu laikā - Mjanmas valdība pieņēma 11. stundas lēmumu neuzskaitīt tos, kuri vēlējās sevi identificēt kā Rohingju, un uzskaitīs tikai tos, kuri akceptēja bengāļu klasifikāciju. Šis solis notika, reaģējot uz Rakhine budistu cenzēto boikotu.Šajā procesā valdība atkārtoja savu iepriekšējo apņemšanos ievērot starptautiskos skaitīšanas standartus.

As with the rest of Myanmar’s postindependence borderlands that were historically multiethnic and politically fluid, Rakhine state had also suffered from decades of centre-periphery imbalances. On the one hand, Buddhist Rakhines had long felt oppressed by the Burmans, the country’s largest ethnic group, and on the other hand, they perceived the Muslim population to be a palpable threat to their cultural identity. Within the Myanmar context, race and ethnicity were rigid constructs that determined legal, political, and social relations. The debate surrounding the Rohingya terminology had, as such, paralyzed meaningful government recognition of the predicament of the Rohingya community.

Statelessness.

Almost all Rohingya in Myanmar were stateless. They were unable to obtain “citizenship by birth” in Myanmar because the 1982 Citizenship Law did not include the Rohingya on the list of 135 recognized national ethnic groups. The law had historically been arbitrarily applied in relation to those, such as the Rohingya, who did not fall strictly within the list of recognized ethnic nationalities. The legal status of a large majority of Rohingya was rendered even more precarious when Pres. Thein Sein unexpectedly announced in February 2015 the expiry of “white cards,” a form of temporary identity documentation held by many within the Rohingya community.

Intercommunal Violence and Displacement.

Two waves of intercommunal violence between Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine state in June and October 2012 led to the displacement of approximately 140,000 people—the large majority of whom were Rohingya—to camps around the state capital (Sittwe) and surrounding townships. According to government figures, the conflicts resulted in 192 deaths, 265 injuries, and the destruction of 8,614 homes, with the impact disproportionately borne by Muslim communities. Human Rights Watch, as well as other nongovernmental organizations, claimed that the October 2012 violence was a coordinated campaign targeting the Rohingya.

Legislative Restrictions.

Following the 2012 violence, other developments, including a series of proposed legislative measures (some of which were passed by Myanmar’s parliament), resulted in further restrictions on the limited rights of the Rohingya. Although those developments had a nationwide application, they were understood to affect mostly the Rohingya community.

In September 2014 an amendment to the 2010 Political Parties Registration Law came into force; the legislation effectively disallowed the Rohingya to form and be members of political parties. Less than six months later, the Constitutional Tribunal delivered an opinion that prevented noncitizens from voting in any national referendum. The legal implication of the decision, formalized in June 2015 with amendments to the election laws, was that Rohingya, who were considered noncitizens, would not be allowed to vote in the 2015 general elections, even if they had cast their ballots during the 1960, 1990, and 2010 elections. The development also represented a final and absolute curtailment of the political rights of the Rohingya.

In November 2014 a package of draft laws popularly termed “laws on safeguarding race and religion” was submitted in the parliament for debate. The bills, which were initially proposed in 2013, were to an extent premised on anxieties over Myanmar’s being surrounded by highly populated countries, a factor that was believed to potentially affect the country’s demographics; on fears that Buddhist women were being coerced or tricked into marriages by and with non-Buddhist men; and on stereotypical views that Muslim families were polygamous and that consequently many children were being born. The bills were conceived as a necessary measure to protect Buddhist women and to address the perceived high population growth rate in Rakhine state.

Between May and July 2015, two of the four bills that permitted the state to regulate birth spacing and family planning, as well as to police the practice of religion within multireligious families, were passed by the parliament. The Population Control Healthcare Bill, which was aimed at Muslim women, could potentially be used to force women to space their births at least three years apart.